Security clearances don’t determine whom a president can trust – they reveal risks the president may not know

One of President Donald Trump’s closest aides, Natalie Harp, worked in the White House for more than a year without completing the normal security clearance process, according to a recent MS Now report.

Harp may have been among the personnel granted interim Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information access at the beginning of Trump’s second term. Trump authorized such clearances in January 2025 for up to six months, allowing officials to begin work while the normal background investigations proceeded.

According to the MS Now report, however, Harp declined multiple times over more than a year to begin that process, submitting the required forms in recent months after concerns were raised inside the White House and Trump intervened. She has since been granted clearance.

The circumstances surrounding Harp are unusual, but the tension they expose is not. New presidential administrations need people in place immediately, but the government’s security-vetting system can take months to complete. Interim clearances are one way of reconciling those competing demands.

The difficulty comes when temporary access and the investigation that is supposed to follow it cease to move together. Understanding why that matters requires first looking at what the clearance process actually involves.

The clearance process

I’m an international affairs professor, and I’ve held executive roles in the CIA, National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Agency. Before I could be hired to begin my nearly 30 years in the U.S. intelligence community, I completed a lengthy questionnaire required for a high-level clearance and underwent an extensive background investigation. CIA applicants also face additional scrutiny, including a polygraph. My process took about six months.

The CIA’s clearance process is uniquely intimidating, intrusive and exhausting – something I warn students who are interested in applying to the agency to expect.

Not every federal agency subjects applicants to the same degree or type of scrutiny, and requirements vary according to the position and level of access. But security vetting for national security positions is rarely simple or quick. Investigators may examine a person’s employment history, finances, foreign contacts, travel, criminal conduct, drug use and other personal circumstances. They may interview employers, neighbors, friends and family members, and require additional screening.

Despite repeated government efforts to shorten the clearance process, it can take considerably longer today than what I experienced. The Government Accountability Office reported in February 2026 that the fastest 90% of initial Top Secret clearances took an average of 206 days as of early 2025. The government’s goal was 114 days.

Those timelines present an obvious problem: Between Election Day and inauguration, an incoming administration has roughly 11 weeks – about 77 days – to assemble the people who will immediately begin dealing with military operations, intelligence, terrorism, diplomacy and other national security issues.

Prospective Cabinet-level national security nominees can be submitted for expedited background investigations during the presidential transition, and transition personnel who need classified information can begin the clearance process before Election Day. Senior nominees are also typically given priority.

But a new White House includes hundreds of political appointees and aides who may not have been identified far enough in advance for that process to be completed. That’s why interim clearances exist: They allow necessary access while the underlying vetting proceeds. They are not, however, a substitute for it.

What investigators are trying to learn

Security investigations are not solely focused on measuring a person’s loyalty to the U.S. They are also seeking to identify vulnerabilities that could make someone susceptible to pressure, coercion or exploitation.

A person may have extensive foreign contacts because of previous work overseas. Financial difficulties may have an innocent explanation. Past misconduct can be mitigated by the passage of time or changed behavior. The clearance process generally considers the person and the circumstances as a whole. But investigators cannot evaluate something they never discover.

A president may know an aide extremely well and have complete confidence in that person’s loyalty and discretion. The president is entitled to make that judgment.

An investigator’s role is different. That security officer asks whether there is relevant information about that person that the president does not know.

What presidential aides hear

During my time as executive aide to the deputy director of the CIA, I was not just preparing background memos for meetings or serving as his representative with senior agency officials; I was present for much of his working day, including formal and informal discussions.

I was aware of virtually every major agency operation and priority, sometimes simply by being in the room. Some of that information never appeared in a document I handled, but it was exceptionally sensitive and known to very few people.

Foreign intelligence services do not need an aide to carry classified files out of the West Wing to gain something useful. Access to the president’s informational environment can itself be a valuable target. That is why the issue of an uncompleted investigation is broader than whether someone improperly opened a classified file. For someone operating within the president’s immediate circle, an undiscovered vulnerability can carry significantly greater consequences.

Balancing access and security

The slow clearance process is itself a security problem. A new administration cannot reasonably leave important White House positions vacant for six or seven months while investigations are completed. Interim access recognizes that reality. But there is a difference between accepting a known security risk and choosing not to determine what that risk might be.

For most government employees, that choice is constrained by a system of investigations, adjudications and access requirements. The president occupies a different position. Their constitutional authority over classified information gives them considerable latitude over access, particularly among their own White House staff.

That makes the investigation more important, not less. Once it is complete, a president can decide that whatever concerns the investigation uncovered are outweighed by their confidence in an aide.

But without an investigation, they are not overriding a security judgment; they are making the decision without one.